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In 1997 the High Court of Solomon Islands delivered its decision in Guadalcanal Provincial 
Assembly v The Speaker of National Parliament, 1 declaring void the Provincial Government Act 
1996, 2 on the basis that several parts of that measure were unconstitutional. That decision was 
considered 3 and criticised 4 in an earlier article. 
The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against that judgment. This paper examines the Court of 
Appeal's decision and comments on its significance for Solomon Islands and the South Pacific region 
* Kenneth Brown is a former magistrate and Public Solicitor of Solomon Islands and is presently a PhD 
candidate at Northern Territory University, Australia, researching customary law in Solomon Islands 
and Vanuatu. 
** Jennifer Corrin Care is a Senior Lecturer in law at the University of Queensland and a Barrister and 
Solicitor of Fiji and Solomon Islands. 
1 Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly v The Speaker of National Parliament (26 February 1997) unreported, High 
Court, Solomon Islands, Civ Cas 309/9. 
2 Provincial Government Act 1996, no 3 of 1996. 
3 The first instance decision in this case was discussed in Corrin Care, J "Democratic Fundamentals in the 
Solomon Islands" (1997) 27 VUWLR 501. 
4 Corrin Care, above n 3, 511.
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generally. In particular, it considers the extent of state legislative power, the role of a preamble, and 
the human rights implications for women. 
I CASE HISTORY 
A The Decision at First Instance 
In early 1996 Parliament passed the Provincial Government Act. This purported to repeal 
the Provincial Government Act 1981 and replace the existing system of provincial 
government with a new regime. In place of the offices and bodies established under the 1981 
Act, provision was made for ten Area Assemblies within each province.  These were to be 
constituted half by elected members and half by appointed chiefs and elders. Each province 
was also to have a Provincial Council, instead of the existing Provincial Assembly.  This 
Council was to be constituted by the Chairs of all the Area Assemblies in the province. It was 
therefore possible for the legislature of a province to consist exclusively or predominantly of 
non­elected members. 
The 1996 Act was challenged in Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly v The Speaker of National 
Parliament and the Minister for Provincial Government. 5 Palmer J concluded that the 
establishment of, and conferring of functions on, Provincial Councils under Part III and IV of 
the 1996 Act was unconstitutional. He considered the lack of provision for accountability by 
an elected assembly to contravene the principles of representative and responsible 
government. He viewed democratic accountability to be an integral part of the fabric of the 
written Constitution of Solomon Islands. 
He went on to hold that the establishment of, and conferring of functions on, the Area 
Assemblies under Part V and VI of the 1996 Act was also inconsistent with the underlying 
constitutional principles of representative and responsible government. In addition to the lack 
of accountability, it did not constitute a truly representative form of government, as non­ 
elected members might be in a position to control the Chair and the "mind" of the Assembly. 
He condemned this as particularly objectionable in the light of the fact that the Assembly had 
both executive and legislative authority. 
5 Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly v The Speaker of National Parliament and the Minister for Provincial 
Government (26 February 1997) unreported, High Court, Solomon Islands, Civ Cas 309/96.
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Palmer J also considered Parliament's legislative power to legislate for provincial 
government, conferred by section 114 (2) of the Constitution. Much turns on the pithy 
wording of this section, which reads: 6 
Parliament shall by law­ 
…
(b) make provision for the government of Honiara city and the provinces and consider the 
role of traditional chiefs in the provinces. 
His Lordship held that the exercise of the power granted by section 114(2) so as to provide 
for the possibility of elevation of chiefs (or elders) 7 to key and/or controlling positions in 
provincial government was contrary to the democratic notions of representative and 
responsible government enshrined in the broad tenor of the Constitution. 
Accordingly, Palmer J declared Parts III, IV, V, VI of the 1996 Act void. As, in His 
Lordship's view, the principles outlined could not be separated or severed without wholesale 
amendment of the Constitution, commencing with the preamble, the whole Act was void. 
B The Decision on Appeal 
In 1997, the Court of Appeal in The Minister for Provincial Government v Guadalcanal 
Provincial Assembly, 8 heard an appeal from Palmer J's decision. The main issues for 
consideration, as at first instance, were: 
· whether the Constitution required the system of government, including provincial 
government, to comply with principles of representative and responsible 
government; and if so 
· whether the 1996 Act contravened those principles. 
Kapi P referred to the English common law approach of allowing the preamble to be used 
in interpreting sections of a statute only in cases of ambiguity. 9 He reviewed the case law 
6 The section was inserted to pacify secessionist sentiments in the lead­up to independence. 
7 Section 114(2) refers to "chiefs" only, but the 1996 Act referred to "chiefs and elders". At first instance, 
Palmer J suggested that Parliament was bound by "the express and specific words of the Constitution" 
and was not allowed to provide for the role of "elders" in provincial government. 
8 The Minister for Provincial Government v Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly (11 July 1997) unreported, Court 
of Appeal, Solomon Islands, Civ App 3/1997.
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from other jurisdictions and determined that the preamble was an unqualified part of the text 
of a constitution and could be used in interpretation of other provisions, whether or not there 
was ambiguity. He concluded by observing: 
I consider that the preamble of the Constitution of Solomon Islands is no different to the nature of 
preambles in other constitutions. The preamble is a general statement of jurisprudential philosophy 
or underlying principles or beliefs by the people as the basis of the new nation. To this extent it is 
permissible as has been illustrated by decisions from other jurisdiction for courts to have regard to 
preambles in construing provisions of Constitutions. However, in my opinion, these general 
statements must not be read as constituting legal principles on their own. 
As pointed out by Kapi P, in order for the preamble to be of use, there had to be some 
applicable provisions to interpret. He felt that section 114 of the Constitution left the nature 
and powers of provincial government entirely to the National Parliament and that nothing in 
the Constitution dealing with executive government or the national legislature (Chapters V 
and VI) required Parliament to comply with democratic principles when legislating for 
provincial government. 
The only remaining question was whether such provisions could be implied. Kapi P had 
no doubt they could not. Williams JA believed that the judge at first instance had, in essence, 
resolved the issue by consideration of express provisions of the Constitution. Accordingly he 
felt that this was "not an appropriate case in which to finally determine the Court's power 
with regard to implying terms into the Constitution or drawing implications therefrom." 10 In 
any event, Williams JA was of the view that there was nothing undemocratic in the 
provisions of the 1996 legislation.  Goldsborough JA concurred in the view that this was not a 
proper case in which to consider whether a necessary implication arose, but based his 
decision on the fact that the necessary implication of democratic principles into the 
Constitution had not been argued by counsel for the respondent and neither had the counsel 
for the appellant had the opportunity to argue the point in response. The appeal was 
therefore allowed and the 1996 Act confirmed as valid. 
9 Attorney­General v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 438. Williams JA,  22, distinguished this 
case on the grounds that it concerned the position when the statute under construction was clearly 
divided into a preamble and an enacting part. 
10 Attorney­General v Prince Ernst Augustus of Hanover, above n 9, 28.
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II COMMENTARY 
A The Preamble 
Traditionally, a preamble is a section at the beginning of a statute, which sets out why the 
legislation is necessary. This can be contrasted with the long title, which states the main legal 
changes the Act is to make to fill that need. Typically, the preamble contains a recital of the 
mischief which the Act is designed to remedy. Preambles are often identifiable by the 
opening word "Whereas". They are rarely used today, except in documents of international 
significance, such as legislation implementing multilateral treaties and legislation of 
constitutional importance. They may also be found in legislation of an historic nature and 
legislation dealing with personal or private interests. In many constitutions of the Pacific 
region an introductory section has been used to incorporate expressions of the values and 
ideals said to underpin the constitution. This is the case with the Solomon Islands 
Constitution. The question arises whether this is properly called a "preamble" or is really 
something rather different, which ought to be separately categorised. 
The term "preamble" is not found in the Solomon Islands Constitution itself, although it is 
used as a heading to similar clauses in other regional constitutions, for example, the 
Constitution of Tuvalu. However, a distinction may be drawn between the Solomon Islands 
Constitution and that of Tuvalu, where the preamble is combined with the enacting words. In 
the Solomon Islands Constitution, the paragraphs containing underlying principles and 
philosophies are separate and use the words "declare" and "agree and pledge" in capital 
letters. Accordingly, they might perhaps be more correctly referred to as the "Declaration, 
Agreement and Pledge". 
The counter­argument, that this introductory part was intended as a preamble, even 
though it does not commence with the traditional words or deal with the traditional subject­ 
matter, gains support from the Report of the Solomon Islands Constitutional Conference. 11 
The Conference met in 1977 to consider the Chapters of a Position Paper adopted by the 
Solomon Islands Legislative Assembly. The Conference agreed that the Constitution should 
embody the principles set out in the Report, including the following paragraph: 
Preamble 
11 Report of the Solomon Islands Constitutional Conference (Miscellaneous Paper No 22, London, 1977).
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(a) all power in the country belongs to the people of Solomon Islands, and is exercised on their 
behalf by the legislature, executive and the judiciary established by the Constitution; 
(b) … 
(c) … 
(d) the system of government is based on democratic principles of universal suffrage and the 
responsibility of executive authorities to elected assemblies; 
(e) a commitment to decentralisation of legislative and executive power … 
Perhaps the most important consideration is whether the reasoning within the judgments 
dealing with traditional preambles may properly be applied to the commencing words of the 
Constitution, whatever they are labelled. 
The status of the "Declaration, Agreement and Pledge" or "preamble" was of considerable 
significance in the Court of Appeal's judgment. As already noted Kapi P cited the English 
common law tradition of refusing to use the preamble as a guide to statutory interpretation 
except in clear cases of ambiguity. However, his wide­ranging survey of Commonwealth case 
law led him to conclude that the preamble was an unqualified part of the text of a 
constitution and could be used in interpretation of other provisions even in the absence of 
ambiguity. 
However, his Lordship declined to employ the "preamble" as an aid to interpretation in 
this case, as he viewed the legislative power set out in section 114 in relation to provincial 
government as unequivocal. The preamble could not itself be used as a directive to this effect 
and, as there was no discernible directive in the Constitution requiring Parliament to exercise 
its powers in a particular way, it could not be used to demand compliance with democratic 
principles when legislating for provincial government. 
Goldsborough JA agreed that the preamble could not be used as a substantive provision 
and took the traditional line regarding its use as an aid to interpretation. Whilst recognising 
that the word "preamble" did not appear in the Constitution and emphasising that the title 
was used only "for the sake of convenience", his Lordship expressed the view that later 
provisions must stand alone except where their meaning was ambiguous. 
Williams JA also made it clear that he used the term "preamble" only for the sake of 
convenience. He took a different approach on its effect, drawing a distinction between a 
statute which is clearly divided into a preamble and an enacting part and one, such as the 
Solomon Islands Constitution, where the introductory words are "as much a part of the
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN SOLOMON ISLANDS 659 
Constitution as any of those clauses." Accordingly, he considered that Attorney­General v 
Prince Ernest of Hanover 12 had no application, being an authority for the approach to be 
adopted only when construing a statute clearly divided into a preamble and an enacting part. 
The Irish Constitution commences with a declaration, including the aspiration of "seeking 
to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that 
the dignity and freedom of the individual might be assured". This has been used as the basis 
for judicial activism in a number of Irish cases. For example, in McGee v Attorney General 
Walsh J said: 13 
According to the preamble, the people gave themselves the Constitution to promote the common 
good with due observance of prudence, justice and charity so that the dignity and freedom of the 
individual might be assured. The judges must, therefore, as best they can from their training and 
their experience interpret these rights in accordance with their ideas of prudence, justice and 
charity. It is but natural that from time to time the prevailing ideas of these virtues may be 
conditioned by the passage of time; no interpretation of the constitution is intended to be final for all 
time. 
If English precedent applying to preambles was distinguishable on the basis that it 
applied only to traditional preambles, which served a different purpose to the declaration in 
the Solomon Islands, it followed that the weight and use of the introductory words was an 
open question. In particular, there was nothing prohibiting their use as substantive 
provisions, and so providing the directive that Kapi P found missing. It is unclear whether 
Willams JA would have been prepared to go this far; his finding that the provisions of the 
1996 Act were not undemocratic made it unnecessary for him to make this decision. 
B Traditional chiefs, discrimination and customary law 
The crucial legal issue in contention ostensibly revolved around the interpretation of the 
"preamble" to the Constitution and its effect in relation to the powers of the legislature. 
Preoccupation with this question clouded a significant rights issue. Discrimination appeared 
as a side issue only on appeal.  The critical area was the position of traditional leaders. 
The Court of Appeal considered briefly whether the 1996 Act was discriminatory without, 
it would appear, hearing argument on point. It determined it was not.  This view that 
12 Attorney­General v Prince Ernest of Hanover [1957] AC 436. 
13 McGee v Attorney­General [1974] IR 284. See also The State (Healy) v Donoghue [1976] IR 325.
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discriminatory provisions are validated by Parliament's mandate to consider the role of 
traditional chiefs in provincial government fails to consider the legislative power in the 
context of the fundamental rights provisions. 
The Constitution requires section 114 to be exercised within the boundaries of the rights 
agenda. The relationship of the non­discrimination charter to customary law is crucial but has 
not yet been sufficiently argued. To understand the dilemma some key measures of the 
Constitution require comment. The starting point is sections 75 and 76. 
These stipulate: 
75 (1) Parliament shall make provision for the application of laws, including customary laws. 
(2) In making provision under this section, Parliament shall have particular regard to the 
customs, values and aspirations of the people of Solomon Islands. 
76 Until Parliament makes other provision under the preceding section, the provisions of 
Schedule 3 to this Constitution shall have effect for the purpose of determining the operation 
in Solomon Islands­ 
(a) of certain Acts of the Parliament of the United Kingdom mentioned therein; 
(b) of the principles and rules of the common law and equity; 
(c) of customary law; and 
(d) of the legal doctrine of judicial precedent 
Section 76 is an essential corollary to section 75. It is a non­substantive sweeping­up 
provision directing reference to Schedule 3 14 for the application and precedence of laws until 
14 "Application of Laws 
1 Subject to this Constitution and to any Act of Parliament, the Acts of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom of general application and in force on 1st January 1961 shall have effect as part of the law 
of Solomon Islands, with such changes to names, titles, offices, persons and institutions, and as to 
such other formal and non­substantive matters, as may be necessary to facilitate their application to 
the circumstances of Solomon Islands from time to time. 
2 (1) Subject to this paragraph, the principles and rules of the common law and equity shall have 
effect as part of the law of Solomon Islands, save in so far as: 
(a) they are inconsistent with this Constitution or any Act of Parliament;
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Parliament makes specific legislative provision. This is essential in view of the inaction of 
Parliament. 15 The section contemplates that it is to be a transitional and temporary measure 
but the probability is that it is likely to remain as a long­term, if not permanent feature. 
Sections 75 and 76, as examined with Schedule 3, are prescriptive and brand customary 
law as substantive and organic. Paragraph 3(3) of Schedule 3 in no way limits this, catering 
only for programmatic non­substantive matters. 
The Solomon Islands Constitution Chapter II is headed Protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the individual. This chapter's origins lie in Western declarations and it follows the 
widely­used formula in British designed constitutions of defining and granting the right or 
freedom and then immediately proceeding to limit the scope of its exercise and operation. 
This is conspicuous from section 15, the measure having direct relevance to discrimination 
and customary issues. 
(b) they are inapplicable to or inappropriate in the circumstances of Solomon Islands from 
time to time; or 
(c) in their application to any particular matter they are inconsistent with customary law 
applying in respect of that matter. 
(2) The principles and rules of the common law and equity shall so have effect notwithstanding any 
revision of them by any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom which does not have effect as 
part of the law of Solomon Islands. 
3 (1) Subject to this paragraph, customary law shall have effect as part of the law of Solomon 
Islands. 
(2) The preceding subparagraph shall not apply in respect of any customary law that is, and to the 
extent that it is, inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of Parliament. 
(3) An Act of Parliament may: 
(a) provide for the proof and pleading of customary law for any purpose; 
(b) regulate the manner in which or the purposes for which customary law may be 
recognised; and 
(c) provide for the resolution of conflicts of customary law." 
15 An added imperative of the section is the obvious problem of legislating for all conceivable situations.
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Section 15 16 is a fairly standard non­discrimination clause.  Although modern human 
rights norms are premised in Western juristic values it is often claimed that they represent 
universal values and thus are culturally neutral. 17 The arena and exposition of human rights 
is founded on the expression of guiding civilised behavioural norms. Human rights are, like 
Western law systems, rule dominated. It is doubtful if traditional Pacific island societies had a 
rule orientated culture. 
Non­discrimination is critical in the divide between Western values and the needs of 
custom. This is so because patriarchal values are, at least formally, overriding and ubiquitous 
16 "15 (1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (5), (6) and (9) of this section, no law shall make any 
provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsections (7), (8) and (9) of this section, no persons shall be 
treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue of any written law or in the 
performance of the functions of any public office or any public authority. 
(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (9) of this section no person shall be treated in a 
discriminatory manner in respect of access to shops, hotels, lodging houses, public restaurants, 
eating­houses or places of public entertainment or in respect of access to places of public resort 
maintained wholly or partly out of public funds or dedicated to the use of the general public. 
(4) In this section, the expression "discriminatory" means affording different treatment to 
different persons attributable wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, place of 
origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex whereby persons of one such description are 
subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such description are not 
made subject or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of 
another such description. 
(5) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to any law so far as that law makes provision­ 
… 
(d) for the application of customary law. 
17 See the analysis in Bennett Human Rights and African Customary Law (Juta & Co, Cape Town, 1995) 2­5. 
This work, ostensibly concerned with the South African Interim Constitution of 1993, is a lucid general 
exposition and examines all the crucial issues. R Pannikar "Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western 
Concept?" (1982) 120 Diogenes 75 answers his own question in the affirmative. His argument shows 
that the roots of modern human rights are Western, liberal and protestant and that a cultural value only 
exists in a given cultural context. For an incisive and valuable contribution on Asia see Yash Ghai 
"Human Rights and Asian Values" (1998) 9 Public Law Review 168.
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in customary societies. 18 This patriarchy pervades not only the social norms but also the 
command and control of institutions. 19 
Non­discrimination prescriptions outlaw much of this patriarchal edifice and some newly 
independent nations have chosen to protect customary norms by exempting customary 
matters from the body of fundamental rights. The rationale for this course is twofold: a desire 
to preserve traditional structures to enhance "harmony" and social stability 20 and a 
recognition that cultural constructs cannot be eradicated overnight by high­sounding 
declarations. They superficially display an allegiance to what might be termed the idealised 
golden age view of customary law. 
The disciples of this theory view custom as a benign agent in promoting social harmony. 
The belief that custom has slowly matured into an inherently worthy assemblage of norms 
embodying distilled and tested wisdom may in fact be wishful thinking. 21 At its heart it is a 
conservative manifesto. Therefore it serves the interests of those with most to lose from any 
social transformation. Those who defend the existing social order are likely to be senior men. 
Custom for many may be a means of retaining social and, by extension, political control; 
"harmony" being employed merely as a pleasant­sounding, acceptable euphemism. It is 
important to be aware that those who promote a forceful custom agenda may be fighting to 
retain social authority and power. 
18 As indeed they were in the West until the rise of feminism in the second half of the 20th century. 
19 For a comprehensive review of the power and influence of patriarchal norms in Melanesia see DD 
Johnson, "Aspects on the Legal Status of Women in Papua New Guinea" (1979) 7 Melanesian Law 
Journal 5. For an analysis of how the courts of Papua New Guinea have tackled the patriarchal bedrock 
of customary practice see Jessep O "Village Courts in Papua New Guinea: Constitutional and Gender 
Issues" (1992) 6 Int Journal of Family Law 401. The saga continues there: see the case of In re Kepo 
Raramu and the Yowe Village Court (1994) PNGLR 486 where a judge condemned as unconstitutional the 
actions of a village court which had imprisoned a widow for breaching custom by going around with 
other men. 
20 As Bennett, above n 17, 5 indicates age, tradition and the past are venerated in customary societies. In 
contrast the West venerates and worships youth, vitality, "the new" and glamour. 
21 See the exposition in Chanock M Law Custom and Social Order, (Cambridge University Press, New York, 
1985) 4 and following, dispelling the "continuity" theory. He argues convincingly that there is a large 
element of myth making in the construction of customary law.
664 (2001) 32 VUWLR 
Section 15(5)(d) of the Solomon Islands Constitution enables Parliament when providing 
for the application of customary law, to do so in a manner that may be discriminatory. 22 This 
protecting of customary law from the usual application of the norms of equality is a highly 
contentious issue. 
The political position of women is precarious if they are exposed to the full rigours of 
customary law. 23 In marriage and landholding their legal rights are fragile and their formal 
social status low. Their political leverage is negligible. That there remains a long road to 
actual equality is exemplified by the rationale behind some comment in the case under 
review. 
The prescription of the 1996 Act replaced a system of Provincial Assemblies made up 
entirely of elected members with a non­democratic model based on Provincial Councils to 
which members were indirectly elected by Area Assemblies. These Area Assemblies 
consisted of equal numbers of elected members and members appointed from chiefs and 
elders. Williams JA surveyed the Act and the Constitution and concluded: 
Firstly the traditional position is that only a male can be a "traditional chief". That means that one­ 
half of the members of the Area Assembly must be males and that, it might be said, effectively 
denies females equal opportunity with males. There is certainly force in this argument, but the 
answer in essence is that the Constitution recognises that the "traditional chiefs" should play a role 
in government at the provincial level. The Constitution itself therefore recognises this imbalance or 
discrimination and it will remain until the role of "traditional chiefs" under the Constitution is re­ 
evaluated. Initially the role of women in government will be limited to standing for election to Area 
Assemblies, and undoubtedly when that has become more readily accepted, consideration will be 
given to the discriminatory effect of appointing chiefs and elders pursuant to sections 30 and 31 of 
the 1996 Act. 
22 Solomon Islands is not a party to the 1979 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) United Nations. If it were, the protective fence around 
customary law would have to be dismantled. 
23 The authors examine the present state of affairs in "Conflict in Melanesia: Customary law and the 
Rights of Women" (1999) 24 (3&4) CLB 1334. The article does not touch on Papua New Guinea, the 
largest Melanesian population base but the situation there is neatly summed up by Los J in State v 
Kopilyo Kipungi and Others (1983) N 437: "Although the equality of the sexes is now a constitutional 
principle in Papua New Guinea, at this stage it is more a matter of books, rather than practice. The 
character of all aspects of life is a male dominance."
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Goldsbrough J A echoed this analysis and commented: 
Parliament has made provision for provincial government. It was required to do so. It has 
considered, as required, the role of traditional chiefs. Indeed it has decided to enhance their role as 
compared to the repealed legislation. In this regard it is clear that women may be disadvantaged, 
given that traditional chiefs are male. This I conclude cannot be said to offend against the 
Constitution, as it is a required consideration by that same constitution. 
These passages acknowledge that genuine equality is at the gift of men, as realistically 
they will dominate any body that re­evaluates the role of traditional chiefs. The political 
power base of men in provincial government will therefore remain unaltered unless men 
themselves determine otherwise. 
The assertion that as the Constitution dictates that Parliament must consider the role of 
traditional chiefs the manner in which it did so was of no legal moment is, it is submitted, 
legally untenable. What the Appeal Justices 24 seem to be contending is that Parliament was 
charged by the Constitution to provide for the position of traditional chiefs and that if it 
devised a formula for doing so that was discriminatory then that discrimination was 
sanctioned by the Constitution itself. This reasoning is circuitous and faulty. The Constitution 
does not bestow upon Parliament any power to make laws that are discriminatory in their 
effect. In fact such laws are specifically outlawed by section 15 (1) of the Constitution 
declaring in categorical terms: "no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either 
of itself or in effect." This and similar injunctions in the Chapter II circumscribe the legislative 
power. There are exceptions to this; the only possibly pertinent one in this context being 
section 15(5) (d) relating to a law providing "for the application of customary law."  This 
seems to be a direct reference to the legislative power in section 75(1) to "make provision for 
the application of laws, including customary laws."  The Provincial Government Act cannot 
be denoted as such a law. 25 
24 Notably Kapi J, the Acting President of the Court who in delivering the leading judgment did not refer 
or consider the discriminatory aspect of the legislation He preferred to rest his conclusions on the 
unlimited power of Parliament. 
25 Palmer J at first instance had adopted a purposive view of the Constitution and denounced the Act as 
discriminatory. This is not the only example of a Pacific Court of Appeal embracing a conservative 
agenda: see Saipa'ia Olomalu and others v Attorney­General [1980­93] WSLR 41 and more recently the 
Solomon Islands Court in Aseri Harry v Kalena Timber Company Ltd (19 April 2000) unreported, Court of 
Appeal, Solomon Islands, Civ App 64/1994.
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Section 114(2) empowers Parliament to "consider the role of traditional chiefs ...". This is 
not a laissez­passer granting any authority to introduce discrimination by the back door. Any 
consideration Parliament bestows must be within the parameters of the Constitution. The 
legislative power is not unlimited although some dicta may suggest otherwise. 26 
Can any persuasive argument be put forward that as the 1996 Act seeks to confirm the 
deference which custom accords to traditional chiefs 27 it is indirectly and implicitly providing 
"for the application of customary law" and therefore exempted from the non­discrimination 
agenda? Or expressed in another way, must a law providing for the application of customary 
explicitly state that it is so doing? 
In clear cases there will be no controversy. The Customs Recognition Act 2000 28 
manifestly was intended to make application for customary law and in the objects and 
reasons laid before Parliament during the passage of the Act, the Minister directly made 
reference to both section 75 and Schedule 3 of the Constitution. Certain aspects of this Act 29 
are either expressly or in their probable effect discriminatory against women. To exempt any 
provision from being regulated by the prescription for non­discrimination unequivocal 
words, expressly invoking the application of custom, would it is argued be mandatory. 
Applying this test to the 1996 Act, the measure can by no yardstick, be providing "for the 
application of custom". What it does is entrench the power and authority of senior men and 
reinforce the existing rigid social structure. The use of the appellation "elder" reinforces this. 
The Appeal Justices in an effort to uphold the legislative power have, it is submitted, 
erroneously interpreted  "consider" far too widely. The wording of section 114(2)(b) of the 
Constitution cannot be taken to assign to Parliament the authority to make such provision for 
traditional chiefs as Parliament thinks fit. Expressed somewhat differently, an authority given 
26 See below n 27. 
27 The 1996 Act sought also to preserve a role for "elders" who are not mentioned in s 114(2). Nevertheless 
Kapi J ruled that "The Parliament has unlimited power to make provision for such elders in a manner it 
considers appropriate." It is submitted that this is erroneous; Parliament cannot pass a law that is 
unconstitutional in itself: Kenilorea v Attorney­General [1984] SILR 179. A feature of Kapi's judgment is 
that it avoids the issue of the discriminatory effect of the 1996 Act. 
28 This Act has yet to be brought into force. 
29 For example ss 8 (f) and 9, governing custom and marriage and the custody and guardianship of 
infants.
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to Parliament to "consider" does not confer a power to legislate in a manner that offends one 
of the fundamental rights of the Constitution. 
Balancing the completing claims of custom and modern norms is a daunting task 
requiring sensitive treatment by the legislature and judiciary. The examples of the Provincial 
Government Act 1996 and the Solomon Islands National Provident Fund (Amendment) Act 1990 30 
give little reason for women to expect Parliament to champion their interests.  Parliament 
must walk a fine line when enacting legislation that might impinge on equality for women, as 
any attempt to prefer or bolster existing male power is open to attack as being 
unconstitutional. As a corollary to this, the judiciary must be on the alert to identify and strike 
down existing legislation that is discriminatory. 
Social resistance will undoubtedly meet the claim by women for equality. Socially they 
tread a quicksand of embedded taboos and practices. More optimistically, legally they have 
section 15(1). To date minute judicial analysis of the scope of this provision has not been 
forthcoming nor has it been the subject of full argument in a superior court. The use of the 
word "provision" in the phrase "no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either 
of itself or in its effect" might at first be thought to refer to a written law only and thus not 
proscribe a rule or practice of custom. However this approach fails on two grounds. Firstly if 
"law" in the subsection is not to be interpreted as including any law from whatever source, 
thus including customary law, then the power contained in section 15(5)(d) of the 
Constitution to distinguish customary law from the general equality prescription is 
redundant.  It also seems section 15(1) employs the term "law" in a generic sense. By contrast 
subsection (2) specifically refers to "any written law" and section 15(5) clearly envisions, by 
the categories of exemption, the enactment of a written law.  This interpretation is crucial for 
them as it interdicts any rule of custom that is discriminatory and represents a powerful 
weapon for women. 
The composition of political bodies in Solomon Islands presents striking proof that 
patriarchy flourishes there. Whilst the ideology undermines the standing of women, it may be 
the Achilles heel of customary law as it is the area in which customary values are vulnerable 
to attack.   Customary law is unlikely to survive, except perhaps as museum piece, if it insists 
30 This Act referred the inheritance of contributions to the Local Court of the deceased home area if the 
member had not nominated to whom his contributions should be paid on his death.  In practice this 
will favour men: see Tanavalu v Tanavalu and Solomon Islands National Provident Fund (12 January 1998) 
unreported, Court of Appeal, Solomon Islands, Civ App 3/1998.
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on buttressing male power and authority. 31 Such a route lays customary law open to ridicule 
and 
if those exercising political powers endorse it then aid and trade may be affected. 32 A 
demonstration of a willingness to work towards the attainment of equality is important and 
attempts to invoke the protective shield of section 15(5)(d) of the Constitution can only be 
counterproductive to the long­term prospects for customary law. 
C Tanavulu and Tanavulu v Tanavulu and SINPF 
The central plank on which the decision in The Minister for Provincial Government v 
Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly 33 stood was the Court's reluctance to question or limit the 
legislative power of Parliament. In Tanavulu and Tanavulu v Tanavulu and SINPF 34 a 
differently constituted court adopted the same conservative line and endorsed the ambit of 
the legislative power in cases involving custom and issues of possible discrimination. There, 
the court had to consider customary inheritance for the purpose of the Solomon Islands 
National Provident Fund Act. 35 That Act provides that where a member of the Fund dies 
without nominating a beneficiary for their accumulated funds, distribution is to be in 
accordance with the custom of the member, "to the children, spouse and other persons" 
entitled in custom. 36 No provision is made as to how this custom is established. In this 
particular case, the deceased had nominated his brother and nephew as beneficiaries when he 
joined the fund. As provided by section 32 of the Act, that nomination became void when he 
married the following year. After his son's death, the deceased's father applied for and was 
paid the amount held in the fund on the basis of custom in Babatana, South Choiseul. Of the 
$11,079 paid to him, the father deposited $4,000 in an interest­bearing deposit account in the 
31 This argument is developed in K Brown "Customary law in the Pacific: an endangered species?" [1999] 
3 JSPL 2. 
32 The United Nations, the United States and countries of the European Union all monitor human rights 
and aid and assistance programmes can be dependent on a good report.  Countries that do not promote 
gender equality may find themselves the subject of increasing pressure from women's groups and 
organisations. 
33 (11 July 1997) unreported, Court of Appeal, Solomon Islands, Civ App 3/1997. 
34 (12 January 1998) unreported, High Court, Solomon Islands, Civ Cas 185/1995. 
35 Solomon Islands National Provident Fund Act Cap 109. 
36 Solomon Islands National Provident Fund Act, s 33(c).
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name of the deceased's son. He used $3,000 to meet funeral expenses and paid $2,000 each to 
the deceased's brother and nephew. $79 was used for his own purposes. The deceased's 
widow challenged this distribution, seeking a declaration in the High Court that she and her 
infant child were entitled to a third share of the money each. The evidence in the case showed 
that inheritance in the deceased's tribe was patrilineal and that the deceased's father was 
entitled to distribute the estate to relatives. According to customary law the deceased's father 
had the discretion to pay some amount of the inheritance to the widow, but in some 
circumstances, for example, as where she had left the father's house, he was entitled to leave 
her out of the distribution altogether. 
Most of the argument concentrated on the interpretation of section 33(c). However, it was 
also argued for the widow, at trial, that the customary law as found was discriminatory and 
hence unconstitutional.  The judge found that the word "law" in section 15(1), did not include 
customary law. His basis for this finding was that the section was referring to a law to be 
made in the future and customary law was not such a law. Rather it was "evolving or was 
already pertaining at the time of the adoption of the Constitution". This interpretation puts 
customary law outside the protection of section 15 for all purposes. However, it is open to 
serious question. Whilst the word "shall" may generally be used to denote indefinite future 
time, legislative drafters employ it to denote an obligation. 37 In a negative phrase such as "no 
law shall" it means "a law must not …". His Lordship went on to say that discriminatory 
customary law would not be outlawed by sub­section (1) in any event, because he considered 
that section 15(5)(c) and section 15(5)(d) excused discriminatory law in a case such as this. 
Section 15(5)(c) exempts law, inter alia,  "with respect to devolution of property on death". 
Arguably this would not cover the distribution of funds under the National Provident Fund 
Act, as the Act removes entitlements from the Fund from a deceased's estate for testamentary 
purposes. 
It appears that the allegations of discrimination were not pursued before the Court of 
Appeal. Nor were the arguments expressed above on the meaning of section 15 put forward. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the first instance decision and limited its consideration of the 
conflict between customary law and protection from discrimination to the following words: 
The Constitution (s 15(5) and cl 3 of Schedule 3) recognises the importance of customary law to 
citizens of the Solomon Islands. The former provision recognises that the application of customary 
37 See further GC Thornton Legislative Drafting (3 ed, Butterworths, London, 1987) 90.
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law may have certain discriminatory consequences. The learned trial judge was correct in holding 
that the Act was not unconstitutional because section 36(c) discriminated against the widow. 
Like the Court of Appeal's ruling in The Minister for Provincial Government v Guadalcanal 
Provincial Assembly, 38 the practical effect of this decision is to perpetuate discrimination 
founded on customary law and practice. 
III CONCLUSION 
Ironically, following the decision in the Provincial Government Case, Parliament enacted the 
Provincial Government Act 1997, which repealed the Provincial Government Act 1996 and re­ 
enacted the Provincial Government Act 1981 with all amendments made prior to its repeal. It 
also contained modifications and transitional provisions necessary in consequence of the 
repeal of the 1996 Act and other incidental provisions. Whilst this legislation resolves the 
problem of undemocratic and discriminatory provisions in this particular case, the potential 
for conflict between principles of democracy and human rights on the one hand and 
customary law on the other remains. With regard to the principles of democracy, without 
specific provision within the Constitution, the Court of Appeal has made it abundantly clear 
that the courts' hands are tied. To this extent the decision is in keeping with the views 
expressed in the earlier article, 39 where it was pointed out that democracy is an abstract 
concept. It was also stressed that the search for a definition of democracy in Solomon Islands 
is particularly complex, as democracy is a Western cultural concept. 
With regard to human rights, and particularly women's rights, the conflict with 
customary law highlighted here is part of the wider debate on the relationship between 
introduced law and customary law. The Constitution seeks to meld these laws, by giving 
customary law a place in the formal system, but fails to provide mechanisms for resolving a 
conflict between the two.  Such conflict is inevitable having regard to the different values 
underpinning introduced law and customary law. This difference is exemplified nowhere 
better than in the gulf between the promotion of women's rights in the Western style charter 
of rights incorporated in the Constitution and the status of women in Melanesian custom. 
In the Tanavulu case, the Court of Appeal gave the following indication of its approach to 
the exercise of legislative power in a discriminatory fashion: 
38 (11 July 1997) unreported, Court of Appeal, Solomon Islands, Civ App 3/1997. 
39 Corrin Care, above n 3, 511.
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It is not for this court to comment on the desirability or social implications of such a provision. 
Parliament has decreed how entitlement is to be established and that is the end of the matter. 
The same approach is evident in the Provincial Government Case. Parliament was 
empowered to legislate for provincial government and in particular to provide for the role of 
chiefs, and the court was not prepared to interfere with this exercise of power on the grounds 
of discrimination. 
The introductory words to the Constitution, whether correctly referred to as a "preamble" 
or a "declaration, agreement and pledge", proclaim a commitment to "democratic principles", 
and " the principles of equality".  The recent armed conflict in Solomon Islands demonstrates 
the fragility of democracy in Solomon Islands. 40 Its illusory nature is also emphasised by 
cases such as The Minister for Provincial Government v Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly. 41 
Unless and until the Court is prepared to take a purposive approach to the interpretation of 
the Constitution and examine legislation with a more critical eye it seems that Parliament 
may introduce laws that are both undemocratic and discriminatory in their effect without fear 
that judicial intervention will strike them down. At first instance, Palmer J issued a reminder 
40 The issue of greater autonomy for the Provinces, or at least the warring provinces of Guadalcanal and 
Malaita Provinces, raised its head during the recent armed conflict in Solomon Islands. An agreement 
was made on 15 October 2000 at Townsville between the Malaita Eagle Force, the Isatabu Freedom 
Movement, Solomon Islands Government and Malaita Provincial Government and Guadalcanal 
Provincial Government with a view to terminating the conflict. Part four of the Townsville Agreement 
addressed the issue under the heading of Political and Socio­Economic issues, in the following terms: 
(a) Malaita and Guadalcanal Provinces shall be given more autonomy by devolution or by 
constitutional amendment to effect self­governing status in order to allow the people of Malaita 
and Guadalcanal to look after their own affairs and to provide for the needs of their growing 
populations. 
(b) Within twenty­eight days from the date of execution of this Agreement or at a later date as may be 
agreed to amongst the parties hereto, the Solomon Islands Government shall establish a 
Constitutional Council to rewrite the Constitution which will provide for more autonomy to 
provinces, taking into account such recommendations as may be made by the committees currently 
reviewing the provincial government system and also noting the exclusive powers of Parliament to 
legislate on such matters. 
(c) The Prime Minister shall appoint members of the Constitutional Council after consultation with all 
provincial governments. 
41 The Minister for Provincial Government v Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly (11 July 1997) unreported, Court 
of Appeal, Solomon Islands, Civ App 3/1997.
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that both Parliament and the courts belong to the people of Solomon Islands. Further 
research, in order to establish a clear mandate on the place of democracy in the context of the 
customary society of Solomon Islands, is now well overdue.
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